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INTRODUCTION
The development of environmental regulatory policy in the United States
during recent years has been marked by the widespread participation and
influence of what we shall term "CIGs" as an acronymn for "Citizen Interest
Groups."' The activities of such groups have frequently benefited from sig-
nificant forms of public financial subvention, particularly through preferential
tax treatment. Part I of this paper surveys the benefits of preferential tax
legislation as they apply to the environmentalist CIG. Part II assesses the re-
strictions prerequisite to such preferential treatment. Finally, part III provides
a brief commentary on the appropriateness of the legal treatment from the
viewpoint of political economy.
Our results suggest that, although the preferential treatment available to
environmentalist CIGs is of substantial value, the political restrictions attached
to such treatment have probably not "cost" the CIGs any substantial reduction
in their impact on policy. We do, however, find cause to entertain reserva-
tions about certain aspects of the current tax treatment of the environmen-
talist groups.
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1. We use the term to refer to broadly based groups whose members share an interest other
than narrow economic benefit. We assume that such groups qualify as "public" under § 509(a) of
the Internal Revenue Code as amended by the Tax Reform Act of 1969. Many such entities are
popularly known as "public interest" groups or law firms. For reasons which will become appar-
ent in part Ill infra, we prefer to avoid the "public interest" terminology.
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
I
ENVIRONMENTALIST BENEFITS UNDER TAx-EXEMPT STATUS
Environmentalist CIGs who successfully qualify under section 501(c)(3) of
the Internal Revenue Code2 enjoy certain valuable forms of public subsidy,
applicable both to the cost and revenue flows of the organization. Qualifica-
tion under this section of the statute renders the organization "tax exempt"
with consequent benefits involving (1) direct avoidance of federal income
taxes,3 and (2) an option to avoid "payroll" taxes levied in the form of social
security and unemployment insurance contributions.4 In the practical sense,
the income tax exemption is of relatively minor economic importance, since
the typical environmentalist CIG tends to incur expenditures roughly equal to
its receipts. By contrast, the exemption from social security and unemploy-
ment taxes has surprisingly high potential to reduce the effective price of
labor services to an environmentalist group.
Although the exact magnitude of the potential labor subsidy attributable
to payroll tax avoidance depends upon the relevant degree of "shifting" of
such taxes between employer and employees, an exemption-related reduction
of over I1 per cent on employee expenses would seemingly be possible.5 In
practice, this potential subvention is exploited to a surprisingly low degree.
For instance, most of the largest CIGs examined in our study have not chosen
to opt out of social security coverage. This choice is not an absolutely indefen-
sible one on strictly economic grounds. However, we argue that the benefits
of opting out are normally clear-cut for any employee who has otherwise
qualified for minimum social security program coverage. Sizeable recent and
projected increases in both the tax rate and minimum annual contribution
will, of course, tend to increase the future advantages of opting out and pos-
sibly also decrease whatever inadvertence currently exists with respect to the
benefits of this option.
If the payroll tax exemption is elected, what effects can be expected? The
labor subsidy should tend not only to increase personnel inputs, because their
relative price is lowered, but also to benefit a particular CIG in rough propor-
tion to the importance of wage payments in its budget. Based on our limited
2. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, as amended, Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat.
487.
3. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3) (1967).
4. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 312 1(b)(8)(B), § 3306(c)(8), respectively.
5. In spring 1975, for instance, an employee social security (FICA) contribution was being
levied on income up to $14,100. Unemployment insurance taxes were being paid by the employer
at a rate of 3.2 per cent on income up to $4,200. The tendency of most economists is to regard
all payroll taxes as borne economically by labor, regardless of the locus of the legal liability. J.
PECHMAN & B. OKNER, WHO BEARS THE TAX BURDEN? 25 & n.l (1974). This suggests that, ceterts
paribus, a 501(c)(3) organization could attract employees at lower nominal wage rates than
non-501(c)(3) employers. For a nontechnical discussion of the alternative assumptions regarding
the true incidence of payroll taxes, see id. at 33, 37.
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sample of IRS information returns for well known environmentalist CIGs, it
appears that the ratio of labor costs to total disbursements for exempt pur-
poses varies widely, ranging from less than one-tenth to more than two-thirds,
the modal percentage falling in the mid-thirties. 6 Hence labor-cost subven-
tions traceable to 501(c)(3) status may have a potential magnitude of between
three and four per cent of the budget of a typical environmentalist CIG with
major national activities. Although possible confirming data are unavailable,
we suspect that the smaller, local environmentalist CIGs benefit less from the
labor subsidy because the labor services to such groups are predominantly
voluntary. In any event, the potential importance of this de facto labor sub-
sidy varies with an environmentalist group's particular view of its "mission"
and the labor-intensity of those activities which are most contributory to that
mission. For instance, a group emphasizing litigation or research would plaus-
ibly face a higher ratio of labor costs to total costs than a literature-oriented
group which, by contrast, would face relatively high ratios of printing and
mailing costs.
Section 501(c)(3) status also indirectly confers another substantial factor-
cost reduction, albeit one widely ignored in the literature on this subject.
Under present Postal Service regulations, such status is a condition for obtain-
ing a "Special Third Class" bulk mailing permit which, at this writing, permits
mass mailings of printed literature at approximately one-third the postal rates
charged to other organizations.' Particularly to the larger, non-local CIGs,
who wish to disseminate informational pamphlets and fund solicitations over
wide geographic areas, the favorable mailing rates confer noteworthy financial
advantages. Regional CIGs, who are tied to local issues and clientele, derive
comparatively less potential benefit from the preferential mailing rates.
Besides reduction of cost items, qualification as a 501(c)(3) entity also
creates very important revenue-raising advantages, since it allows the CIG to
receive contributions which are deductible from the donor's taxes, particularly
the personal income tax.8 The precise impact of the deductibility feature on
the volume of charitable contributions has been subject to varying estimates.
However, the best recent econometric studies suggest that the "price elasticity"
of charitable giving to nonreligious entities is relatively high, a dollar's worth
of tax-saving providing the stimulus for substantially more than a dollar's
worth of incremental contributions. 9 Price elasticity is essentially the ratio of
6. See note 13 infra.
7. For the determination of eligibility, see POSTAL SERVICE MANUAL § 134.5 (1975). In spring
1975, the special rate was 1.8' per piece or I IV per pound, whichever is greater. The regular
bulk mail rate was 6.1IV per piece or 32¢' per pound, whichever is greater. Id. § 134.1.
8. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 170(c)(2) (income tax); § 2055(a)(2) (estate tax); and § 2522(a)(2)
(gift tax).
9. An estimate of the price elasticity of charitable contributions is given by Feldstein, Taxes and
Charitable Contributions: Part Il-The Impact on Religious, Educational, and Other Organizations, 28
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the percentage change in dollars contributed to the percentage change in the
"price," or after-tax cost, of a dollar contributed. The price change impact of
deductibility is equivalent to the fractional dollar of tax avoided on each dol-
lar of otherwise taxable income. Consequently, the percentage change in vol-
ume of contributions can be approximated by the formula:
%AQ = 100E[ t/(1 - t) ],
where Q denotes contributions, E the price elasticity of contributions, t the
marginal rate on taxable income experienced by the CIG's potential con-
tributors, and the square-bracketed term is the percentage change in the
"price" of a dollar contributed.T
In addition to the magnitude of E, the formula listed above illustrates how
the impact of deductibility on personal donations to environmentalist CIGs is
critically dependent on I, the potential donor's tax bracket variable, and hence
on income level. As we will discuss in further detail below, empirical evidence
exists that the environmentalist clientele, as regards active members and con-
tributors, is markedly upper-income in character."1 Therefore, even the as-
sumption of extremely conservative values for E and t, such as 1.0 and .25
respectively, would suggest that one-third or more of the personal contribu-
tions to environmentalist CIGs are contingent on 501(c)(3) status."2
In addition to personal contributions, the major sources of revenue for
environmentalist groups are (1) grants from governments or other nonprofit
foundations, and (2) revenue from sale of literature, research, etc. The ratio
of personal contributions to total revenues varies widely but is frequently
large, especially where the CIG is a "membership organization" such as the
Environmental Defense Fund or the Wilderness Society. For instance, these
two major organizations, both of which have exercised noteworthy influence
on the environmental policy formation process, can apparently expect to de-
NAT'L TAX J. 209 (1975). The lowest estimate for any nonreligious charitable contribution is
1.19. Id. at 217. For other works by Feldstein dealing with estimates of price elasticity, see M.
Feldstein, Estate Taxation and Charitable Bequests 1974 (unpublished manuscript on file with the
authors); MN. FELDSTEIN & C. CLOTFELTER, TAX INCENTIVES AND CHARITABLE CONTRIBUTIONS IN
THE UNITED STATES: A IICROECONOMIc ANALYSIS (Harvard Institute of Economic Research Dis-
cussion Paper No. 381, Sept. 1974).
10. This result is derived from a rearrangement of the price elasticity formula E = %AQ/%AP.
Under existing deductibility provisions, the current "price" of donating is the rate of reduction (1
- t) in one's after-tax income. Repeal of deductibility would raise the "price" to unity, an increase
of t. Hence %AP = 100(AP/P) = 100(t/ (I - t)). Finally, this substitution and rearrangement of
the original formula result in the formula in the text.
11. The best single source on the socioeconomic status of environmentalists is R. DUNLAP, THE
SOCIOECONOMIC BASIS FOR THE ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENT: OLD DATA, NEW DATA, AND
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE MOVEMENT'S FUTURE (Washington State University Scientific Paper No.
4350, 1974). But see also the dissertation of A. St. George, untitled 1975 (unpublished thesis at
University of California-Davis Library); W. Devall, The Governing of a Voluntary Organization:
Oligarchy and Democracy in the Sierra Club, 1970 (unpublished thesis in University of Oregon
Library).
12. See note 9 supra with respect to actual empirical estimates.
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rive about 40 per cent of their budgets from "membership dues" alone, not
including additional "donations" made by members or other individuals.'"
Unlike most membership dues, the dues payable to environmentalist organiza-
tions typically appear to be eligible for deductibility under the standard that
"the rights and privileges of membership are incidental to making the organi-
zation function according to its charitable purposes and the only return ben-
efit thereby obtainable is the satisfaction of participating in furthering the
charitable cause."' 14 Although the eligibility of such membership payments is
frequently noted on CIG solicitation materials, we suspect that at least some
members may nonetheless subjectively associate the "dues" appellation with its
normal non-deductibility, thus weakening the effect of the subvention which
is legally available. 5
In addition to its effect on the flow of funds to the environmentalist
groups in the aggregate, deductibility even more powerfully influences the
competitive position of individual CIGs who are seeking to attract the donor's
favor from possible alternative recipients within the environmentalist "indus-
try." Where other considerations are reasonably balanced, e.g., there exists a
"close substitute" organization, the deductibility condition can be expected to
loom as a critical one. From this standpoint, we hypothesize that CIGs or-
ganized around localized issues benefit less from deductibility than the large
nationally-based groups. In many cases, there will be no substitute or competi-
tive organization whose focus is upon a particular set of local issues. Hence,
the price elasticity of donations to those organizations would be expected to
be relatively low. Although the aims of the major national groups are dif-
ferentiated to some extent, many potential donors will probably perceive the
"products" of several of these major CIGs as extremely close substitutes.
Deductibility is, of course, of no advantage to a potential donor which
itself enjoys tax-exempt status. Hence, 501(c)(3) status is not per se a critical
consideration for environmentalist CIGs in attempting to attract foundation
support. A similar observation applies to governmental sources as notably ex-
emplified by the "public information grants" which have been awarded to
numerous CIGs by the Environmental Protection Agency under the provi-
sions of the Clean Air Act of 1970.16 Hence, the deductibility flowing from
13. Estimates derived from examination of IRS information returns (form 990) for recent
years. Treas. Reg. § 1.6033-1 (1971),
14. Rev. Rul. 432, 1968-2 CuM. BULL. 104.
15. Out of curiosity as to what advice might be given by the IRS's telephone taxpayer advisory
service, the authors raised the deductibility question with two different IRS tax advisors. In each
case, we were advised that such dues were not deductible, once with hesitation and once with
great assurance.
16. Clean Air Act § 103(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 1856b(a)(l) (1970). "Public Information Grants" to
five California CIGs were announced in 38 Fed. Reg. 31238 (1973). The League of Women
Voters and Clean Air Constituency (a coalition of ten environmental organizations including the
Sierra Club) were among those receiving grants.
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501(c)(3) status should tend, ceteris paribus, to diminish the relative reliance of
environmentalist CIG's on governmental and foundation sources for financial
support.
In sum, the economic value of 501(c)(3) status depends to a notable extent
on a particular environmentalist organization's goals. This is true because (1)
part of the tax exemption benefit is a function of the CIG's mix of input
factors, and (2) the impact of deductibility varies with the organization's clien-
tele and potential sources of alternative financial support. To the extent that a
CIG is interested in activities where bulk mailing and hired labor are effec-
tively used, tax-exempt status becomes increasingly valuable. Similarly, the
deductibility of contributions is most valuable when an organization's appeal is
to potential supporters who are highly sensitive to the tax treatment of their
monetary contributions. Hence, little advantage accrues to a small local CIG
using almost exclusively voluntary labor services and receiving primarily
non-monetary forms of support or contributions in kind. Nonetheless, there
can be little doubt that the provisions cited above have materially increased
the resources available to environmentalist CIGs who qualify. The value of
this preferential treatment should be contrasted to the next most favorable
preference level, that available under section 501(c)(4). 7 Under the latter sec-
tion of the Code, "social welfare" organizations are accorded only the corpo-
rate income tax exemption denoted above as having relatively modest finan-
cial value to the typical environmentalist CIG. The Sierra Club and Friends of
the Earth, Inc. are the best known 501(c)(4) organizations active in the en-
vironmental field.
What is the "price" that an environmental group pays to achieve the
rather substantial differential financial benefits of 501(c)(3) rather than (c)(4)?
In theory, the more preferential treatment requires a rather substantial cir-
cumscription of the environmental group's permitted behavior. We examine
this circumscription, in theory and in its estimated actual impact, in the fol-
lowing sections of this paper.
II
RESTRICTIONS ATTENDANT TO PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT
To qualify for 501(c)(3) status, an environmentalist CIG must be organized
and operated for one or more of the purposes regarded as falling within the
intent of that section. Activities of environmental groups have apparently
been deemed to fall under the categories of "charitable," "educational," or
"scientific" as defined by the Internal Revenue Service.i" Qualification under
the "charitable" rubric is presumably of some importance to an environmental
interest organization, since the latter two categories, by requiring a more bal-
17. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(4) (1959).
18. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-I(d) (1967).
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anced presentation of information, may preclude some forms of "advocacy"
exercisable through the media and various other channels.1 9 Environmental
litigation, a particularly effective weapon of environmentalist CIGs in recent
years, appears to fall explicitly within the IRS definition of charitable. For
instance, the guidelines advanced for exempt activities of public interest law
firms require "representation of a broad public interest rather than a private
interest" and the example of "some specific area of public concern, such as
protection of the environment" is explicitly noted.20
Additionally, a 501(c)(3) environmentalist organization must not devote a
"substantial" part of its activities to influencing legislation "by propaganda or
otherwise" in any of several ways: 2
1) Legislative contact, in which the organization approaches, or urges the
public to contact, any legislator:
2) advocacy of the adoption or rejection of a law or referendum; or
3) partisan advocacy of primary objectives which may be attained only
through legislative action.
Further, such organizations are absolutely barred from intervention, directly
or indirectly, in a political campaign on behalf of any candidate for public
office.
These proscriptions, the first three of which delineate the Treasury's con-
cept of an "action" organization, obviously impede a CIG from utilizing cer-
tain methods which might otherwise be extremely efficacious means to en-
vironmentalist ends. Hence, circumscription of political activity is the "price" a
group pays for the considerable benefits described in part I above.
Qualification for the more modest privileges of 501(c)( 4 ) status is open to
the environmentalist CIG as a "social welfare" organization. 22 A social welfare
organization which could qualify under 501(c)(3), were it not for its political
activities, is released by 501(c)(4) from the prohibitions against "action" or-
ganization activities, but it is not released from the proscription of campaign
intervention. 23 In particular, a 501(c)(4) entity may, for example, lobby, take
official stands on impending legislation, or urge its members to contact leg-
islators.
Both the statutory language and the Treasury's administrative guidelines
are the products of a long history of torturous evolution and reinterpreta-
19. See E. BERLIN, A. ROISMAN, & G. KESSLER, LAW AND TAXATION 21, 22 (1970) in connection
with the activities of "conservation" groups. The parallel with environmental groups is close, al-
though the scope of an environmentalist CIG's activities is somewhat broader.
20. Rev. Proc. 39, 1971-2 CUM. BULL. 575 (emphasis added).
21. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(3) (1967).
22. Social welfare organizations are required to be "primarily engaged in promoting in some
way the common good and general welfare of the community." Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(4)-
l(a)(2)(ii) (1959).
23. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(4)-1(a)(2)(ii) (1959).
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tion. 4 In spite of the recent attempt at clarification, 25 it might be expected
that any organization which contemplates activities falling within the "gray
areas" of the political action guidelines should be motivated to adopt an ex-
tremely risk-adverse interpretation of permissible activity, avoiding controver-
sial programs. If so, the environmentalist CIGs would be particularly suscep-
tible to this influence since implementation of their objectives typically in-
volves some instrumentality of the state, whether it be legislative, judicial, or
administrative.
In examining the record of environmental CIGs during the past decade,
the chilling effect of the political proscriptions attached to tax exemption ben-
efits seems more potential than real. As we will elaborate below, three major
mitigating factors appear to account for the comparatively minor effect of
legal restraints on the policy impact of environmentalist CIGs: (1) interlocking
501(c)(4) and 501(c)(3) organizational forms which partially circumvent the
operation of the law; (2) a relatively tolerant attitude on the part of IRS; and
(3) political circumstances which, in our opinion, suggest that the high-return
activities of the environmentalist entities have in any case been chiefly in areas
which are perfectly permissible under 501(c)(3).
The major form of organizational circumvention involves "splitting" a
CIG's activities into interlocking foundations, one of which observes the
501(c)(3) restrictions and receives tax deductible contributions. This 501(c)(3)
foundation is, in turn, operated for the benefit of a parent group which is an
"action" organization engaging in legislative and advocacy activity within the
meaning of 501(c)(4) and the pertinent IRS guidelines. This split is feasible
provided that the parent group is "publicly supported" in the sense of relying
on membership fees or other contributions from the general public. 26 The
two largest 501(c)(4) environmentalist CIGs, the Sierra Club and Friends of
the Earth, exemplify this technique since they both utilize 501(c)(3) founda-
tions as conduits for deductible contributions. 27 F.O.E. carries the orga-
nization specialization a step further by carrying on a cooperative "sister
organization" arrangement with the League of Conservation Voters, an en-
24. Early history of the federal tax exemptions is related in Reiling, Federal Taxation: What Is a
Charitable Organization?, 44 A.B.A.J. 525 (1958). Historical developments relevant to charitable
entities are outlined in Clark, The Limitation on Political Activities: A Discordant Note in the Law of
Charities, 46 VA. L. REV. 439 (1960) and in Note, The Revenue Code and A Charity's Politics, 73 YALE
L.J. 661 (1964). Finally, recent changes are reflected in Garrett, Federal Tax Limitations on Political
Activities of Public Interest and Educational Organizations, 59 GEo. L.J. 561 (1971), and in Note,
Political Activity and the Tax Exempt Organizations Before and After the Tax Reform Act of 1969, 38
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1114 (1970).
25. Rev. Proc. 75-13, 1975 INT. REV. BULL. No. 10, at 46, which purports to "amplify Rev.
Proc. 71-39, 1971-2 C.B. 575, by setting forth procedures under which a public interest law firm
may accept fees for its services."
26. Treas. Reg. § 1.509(a)-3 (1972).
27. The Sierra Club Foundation and Friends of the Earth Foundation, respectively.
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vironmentalist CIG whose direct political intervention activities disqualify it
even from 501(c)(4) status .2
A 501(c)(3) foundation may not control a 501(c)(4). However, nothing
prevents a 501(c)(3) organization from contracting with any other organiza-
tion for services which are consistent with deductible status.29 Likewise, sev-
eral 501(c)(3) organizations could pool "insubstantial" contributions toward
joint lobbyist or advocacy representation. The Washington-based lobbying ac-
tivities of the Environmental Policy Center reflect, to some extent, financial
support from a coalition of environmental groups. 31
The option of using this organizational split-up technique provides a CIG
with the ability to insulate its tax-preference activities from political "taint,"
while still reaping important deductibility benefits. Of course, deductible con-
tributions must nominally be spent for purposes consistent with 501(c)(3)
status. However, where control is truly interlocking, the essential fungibility of
such funds is an economic reality; cross-subsidization occurs because "money
mixes" from the decision-making standpoint even if not from the accounting
one.
3 1
While we recognize the overhanging threat, we find surprisingly little ob-
jective historical evidence to suggest that the IRS has attempted arbitrary or
aggressive enforcement of the statutory guidelines in cases which substantially
affect environmentalist CIGs. The major case of 501(c)(3) revocation in the
environmental sphere involves the Sierra Club, whose tax deductibility
privileges were revoked by the IRS on grounds that the Club came within the
operational test which precludes "substantial" legislative activity. 2 While we
do not necessarily agree with the guidelines invoked by IRS, we are per-
suaded that the "political" activities attributed to the Sierra Club were in fact
reasonably clear violations of the guidelines. 3 Among the chief items were
findings by the IRS that the Club (1) regularly formulated official positions
on proposed legislation; (2) pursued these positions both by mail, magazine,
and newspaper solicitations of its members and the general public as well as
by employment of a professional Washington lobbyist; and (3) elevated the
28. L.C.V. "rates" members of Congress on environmental issues and campaigns for favorable
candidates.
29. See E. BERLIN, A. ROISMAN, & G. KESSLER, supra note 19, at 28.
30. Interview with Joseph Browder, Director of the Environmental Policy Center, by tele-
phone, March 1, 1975. E.P.C. has, in turn, also started an ancillary 501(c)(3) deductible founda-
tion, the Environmental Policy Institute.
31. This fungibility problem is familiar in government finance when the grantor government
attempts to restrict the use of the grants to certain purposes. Applications to state-local school
subventions are analyzed in Bishop, Stimulative Versus Substitutive Effects of State School Aid in New
England, 17 NAT'L TAX J. 133 (1964), and to federal-state revenue sharing in C. GOETZ, WHAT IS
REVENUE SHARING? 11 (1972).
32. Letter Ruling, 6 P-H 1967 FED. TAXES 54,664 (Dec. 16, 1966).
33. This opinion seems to be shared in Note, The Sierra Club, Political Activity, and Tax Exempt
Charitable Status, 55 GEo. L.J. 1128 (1967).
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legislative program to a "regular, formal, purposeful part" of the Club's
operations.
34
Even if the Sierra Club's charge-that the political activity proscriptions
are vague-is rejected, considerable sympathy is merited for their charge that
the requirements invite "unequal and spotty enforcement." 35 It has been ar-
gued that cost and other administrative considerations render the IRS's re-
view activities sporadic at best and that the choice of organizations for review
is not likely to be random. 36 Our own investigation of the pattern of activities
by environmental CIGs leads us to hypothesize that the political activity re-
strictions are, if anything, underenforced in terms of the construction that
might reasonably be placed on the language of the regulations. While a quan-
titatively generous scope of activity is thus implied, a certain qualitatively re-
strictive bias can be expected under these circumstances. In particular, the
larger, more visible organizations and those who engage in programs which
are controversial and highly publicized are more likely to invite adverse
scrutiny. In probabilistic terms, the "cost" of certain political activities is in-
flated relative to less blatant ones. More even-handed, albeit more restrictive,
enforcement is perhaps further compromised by the inability of interested
citizens to challenge the tax deductibility of entities believed to be engaging in
impermissible forms of political activity. 3
7
For all of the furor it has aroused, the extent of the long term dampening
effect of the Sierra Club revocation upon environmentalist CIGs is at least
open to serious question. In any event, we speculate that the real behavioral
implications for CIGs flow less from the question, "does this activity violate
the Code?" than from the worry, "will this activity cause the Code to be in-
voked?"
Our third point argues that, given the existing production function for
"environmental impact," the total impact of environmentalist CIGs on policy
would probably have differed very little in the absence of the political pro-
scriptions now present in the Code and its interpretative regulations. This
point can be couched conceptually in terms of a standard economic maximiza-
tion model.3 8
34. See Letter Ruling, supra note 32, 54,530-53 1.
35. Sierra Club's statement in Hearings on the Subject of Tax Reform Before the House Comm. on
Ways and Mearis, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 15, pt. 2, at 913 (1969).
36. Note, The Revenue Code and a Charity's Politics, 73 YALE L.J. 661, 665 (1964).
37. The exclusive right of the IRS to initiate withdrawal of exempt status is discussed in id. at
665-66 n.19, citing Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923):
And how would a contributor challenge the "ruling" [of deductibility] except by refusing
to deduct the contributions-an unnoticed act of defiance which would be to his finan-
cial detriment. The ordinary taxpayer who might disapprove of the Treasury's selection
would have no standing to object in court because of an alleged improper narrowing of
the tax base and the subsequent alleged harm to him.
38. The model used below will be recognized as an adaptation of the consumer choice mod-
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The CIG is assumed to wish to maximize a well defined39 preference
index which is a function of various types of "impacts" the CIG produces, e.g.,
public opinion, legal precedents, and regulatory or administrative decisions. 4 "
The output produced of any particular impact will, in turn, be a function of
(1) the instrumental activities carried on, such as mailings, lobbyists hired,
press releases issued, etc.; and (2) certain relevant institutional and environ-
mental aspects of the external world in which CIGs operate. 4 1 The choice of
activities also determines the CIG's resource constraint because the activities
both absorb revenues via their money costs and, in addition, influence incom-
ing revenue flows through their possible effect on public or foundation sup-
port, the entity's tax status, and so on.
42
Maximization of the preference index, subject to impact and resource con-
straints, will yield optimal input values (some of which may be zero) for the
various possible activities which a CIG may conduct.4 3 In the formal sense,
our argument is that, even with liberalized political constraints, the solution
set of optimal inputs and, implicitly, the impacts would not have altered ap-
preciably. Ceteris paribus, activities should tend to be heavily utilized when they
are "cost effective," i.e., when their "impact productivities" are high relative to
their costs.4 4 Consequently, the response to change in the statutes will tend to
be minimized when the induced effects of such external variables on the im-
pact productivities and the revenue effect of "important" input activities are
els. See, e.g., G. BECKER, ECONOMIC THEORY 45-50 (1971); Lancaster, Change and Innovation in the
Technology of Consumption, 56 Am. ECON. Ass'N PROCEEDINGS 14 (1966).
39. For expositional simplicity, the group nature of a CIG's decision process is ignored. The
potential difficulties inherent in the formulation of a group decision function were first pointed
out in R. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (2d ed. Cowles Foundation Monograph
No. 1, 1951).
40. The preference index Z is a function of z's which symbolize different possible impacts.
Z = Z(zl, z2 .  z )
41. Produced levels of the z's are, in turn functions of x's which denote "input" activities of an
exogenous variable and E.
z, = Fi (x,, x2 .x.m; E) i = 1, 2_. m
The x's are the observable activities of the CIGs while E is a state variable (or vector of such
variables) which describes relevant aspects of the external world in which CIGs Operate. Legal
precedents, public receptiveness, the status of tax laws, etc., are incorporated in the state variable
E.
42. The resource constraint is a function of the CIG's own activities and of external condi-
tions.
R = R(x,, x 2. x.m; E) R = Ro
43. See G. BECKER, supra note 38; Lancaster, supra note 38.
44. The z1 constraint is collapsed into the preference index Z and maximized. "Impact pro-
ductivities" are the marginal products or incremental changes in any given 'impact" i as a particu-
lar instrumental activity j is varied. This may be represented mathematically by z-- for inputs and
Ox,
.i for resources.
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small.45 We speculate that this condition has been approximately satisfied by
CIGs during recent years. The empirical evidence suggests to us that non-
permissible political activities, such as lobbying, have been of fairly low cost-
effectiveness relative to alternative permissible activities such as litigation and
media publicity. In the following discussion, different classes of inputs, such
as lobbying or litigation, may be understood as separate subsets of those activ-
ity inputs which produce "impacts" and reflect revenue resources.
Environmentalist lobbyists claim to have influenced a wide range of
legislation. 46 Doubtless, they did have perceptible effects on the drafting and
enactment of environment-related legislation. The precise impact of the lob-
byists is difficult to document or quantify, however. In many cases where the
influence of the environmental lobbyists is alleged to have been strong, there
have been other powerful political forces which had reasons to militate in
favor of essentially the same legislative result.47 One hesitates, therefore, to
attempt an imputation of particular results to particular lobbying efforts.
Without denigrating in any way the lobbying efforts of the environmentalist
CIGs, we prefer to point out what appears to be the greater cost-effectiveness
of alternative activities such as the molding of public opinion and litigation.
Through effective use of media, environmentalist CIGs have probably
been extremely instrumental in awakening public opinion to environmental
issues during the late 1960s and early 1970s.4 s The molding of public opinion
is technically a "gray area" of political activity under the Code. On one hand,
the IRS specifically appears to countenance such activity, recognizing that4"
45. Denoted by E, the effect of a change in the statutes on zi and R is given by
a2zi
axj9E
Economists would term this the "cross-effect" of E on the impact productivity of activity Z1.
46. Conversations with environmental lobbyists elicited the following examples: Energy Sup-
ply and Environmental Coordination Act of 1974, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 791,792 (Supp. 1975); The
Wild and Scenic Rivers Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1274 (Supp. 111, 1974), amending 16 U.S.C. § 1274
(1970); Federal Aid to Highway Act of 1973, 23 U.S.C. §§ 101,104 (Supp. 111, 1973), amending 23
U.S.C. §§ 101, 104 (1970); Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1972, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (Supp.
Ill. 1973), amending 33 U.S.C. § 1151 (1970); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1857 (1970); Safe Water
Drinking Act, Pub. L. No. 93-523. 88 Stat. 1660 (1974). amending 42 U.S.C. § 300 (Supp. Ill,
1973); Big Cyprus National Preserve, Pub. L. No. 93-440 (1974), amending 16 U.S.C. § 698 (1970);
Strip Mining Bill, H.R. 3383, S. 425, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974). For other indications of en-
vironmentalists' lobbying activities, see lobbyists' registrations reported in the Congressional
Quarterly Index and Almanac.
47. For instance, environmentalists successfully favored diversion of federal highway trust
fund revenues to aid mass transportation. See Federal Aid to Highway Act of 1973, 23 U.S.C. §§
101,104 (Supp. 111, 1973). But, quite apart from its environmental implications, the diversion was
of crucial financial importance to the "urban" lobby.
48. An analysis of the generation of newspaper publicity by Los Angeles environmentalists is
currently in preparation by George Papadatos, Ph.D. candidate in economics at the Center for
Study of Public Choice, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University.
49. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(2) (1967).
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the fact that an organization, in carrying out its primary purpose, advocates
social or civic changes or presents opinion on controversial issues with the
intention of molding public opinion or creating public sentiment to an accep-
tance of its views does not preclude such organizations from qualifying under
section 501(c)(3) so long as it is not an "action" organization.
On the other hand, the "action organization" test has provided a sufficiently
ambiguous criterion to permit IRS challenges of deductibility on "pro-
paganda" grounds in a number of cases,50 even where mere opinion-molding
rather than overt lobbying is involved. De facto, the IRS has not seemed dis-
posed to apply this test restrictively in the environmental area, possibly be-
cause the "opinion molding" is typically couched in discrete terms.5 Such dis-
cretion includes reference to conditions which require correction (but not to
specific legislation) and heavy reliance on "educational" factual material de-
signed to elucidate the CIG's viewpoint. Although the phraseology of CIG
pamphlets observes certain conventions which reflect the political proscrip-
tions, the effectiveness of the underlying message appears to have been little
diminished.52
The environmentalist CIGs have even wider latitude with respect to state-
ments about administrative or regulatory decisions or about litigation. While
the direct or nominal purpose of such statements is nonlegislative, they fre-
quently contribute to the public climate for future remedial legislation.
Moreover, the generation of publicity is often an extremely low-cost proposi-
tion, open even to the small local CIG which relies on volunteer staff but
effectively manages to dramatize local issues. In our view, this mobilization of
public opinion, analogous to the private sector institutional advertising cam-
paign, has ultimately been much more cost-effective than the types of direct
legislative contact and political intervention which are restricted by the Code.
Notwithstanding the success of the CIGs in this "marketing" of environ-
mental issues through the media to the public, and thence the legislature, a
persuasive case can be made that the courts have actually been the principal
instrument of policy impact. The CIGs are a large and growing force in en-
vironmental litigation, acting as principal plaintiffs in 24 per cent of the 1,145
major environmental cases reported in the period May 1970 to October 1974
and as principal plaintiffs in 45 per cent of the 181 cases during the last ten
months of that period.5 1 One-third of the CIG cases were concentrated
among three major national groups, the Environmental Defense Fund, the
Natural Resources Defense Council, and the Sierra Club, of which only the
50. See the general discussion in Garrett, supra note 24, at 578-81 and the cases cited therein.
51. It would be difficult to apply the adjective discrete to the materials used by the Sierra
Club in the 1966 period preceding revocation,
52. E. BERLIN, A. ROISMAN, & G. KESSLER, supra note 19, at 27.
53. This tabulation is based on the cases reported in 1 ERC (1970) through 6 ERC (1974).
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latter is not a 501(c)(3) entity.54 However, even modest-sized local CIGs have
also been influential in a number of key cases.5 5 Such tabulations understate
the litigation participation of CIGs in several respects since they fail accurately
to account for CIGs included in the et al. faction, 56 in special-purpose
coalitions, 57 in amicus curiae capacities, 58 or as legal or supportive instrumen-
talities.59 However, the pervasive quantitative influence of CIGs in this aspect
of environmental policymaking is clear, even from a conservative tabulation.
In addition, a vast quantity of publicity is generated for environmental pur-
poses by cases which are merely threatened, settled out of court, dropped,
consolidated, etc.
Besides a quantitatively high level of participation, CIGs have achieved a
qualitatively significant record in terms of the impact on environmental policy
of judicial decisions handed down in CIG-initiated cases. For instance, the
environmental groups have motivated key decisions in the law of standing"
and have succeeded in obtaining expansionary judicial interpretations of re-
cent environmental legislation. Such interpretations are exemplified by the
"non-degradation" clear air ruling 6' and the series of cases6 2 spelling out the
requirements of environmental impact statements under the National En-
54. Id.
55. Examples are numerous. One of the most far-reaching of the state environmental policy
cases is Friends of Mammoth v. Board of Supervisors of Mono County, 8 Cal. 3d 247, 502 P.2d
1049, 104 Cal. Rptr. 761 (1972). The standing of citizens to bring suit on grounds of aesthetic
and conservational injuries was established in Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. Federal
Power Comm'n, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965).
56. E.g., Desert People United was a co-plaintiff in the major case City of Riverside v. Ruckel-
shaus, 4 ERC 1728 (C.D. Cal. 1972).
57. A case in point is Clean Air Constituency v. California State Air Resources Bd., 11 Cal. 3d
801, 523 P.2d 617, 114 Cal. Rptr. 577 (1974) in which the plaintiff represented a coalition of ten
environmental groups including the Sierra Club and the League of Women Voters.
58. In the case of County of Inyo v. Yorty, 32 Cal. App. 3d 795, 108 Cal. Rptr. 377 (Ct. App.
1973), amicus curiae briefs were filed by the Izaak Walton League, Center for Law in the Public
Interest, Case Docket, December 1972, at 31, and by Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund, Inc., 5
ERC 1431 (1973).
59. The plaintiffs in City of Riverside v. Ruckelshaus, 4 ERC 1728 (C.D. Cal. 1972), were
represented by the Center for Law in the Public Interest, a 501(c)(3) law group.
60. Environmental Defense Fund v. Hardin, 428 F.2d 1093 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Scenic Hudson
Preservation Conference v. Federal Power Comm'n, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965); Road Review
League v. Boyd, 270 F. Supp. 650 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). See generally Note, Citizen Organizations Inter-
vening in Federal Administrative Proceedings: The Lingering Issue of Standing, 51 BOSTON U.L. REV.
403 (1971); Note, Standing: Who Speaks for the Environment?, 32 MONT. L. REV. 130 (1971) and
cases cited therein.
61. Sierra Club v. Ruckelshaus, 344 F. Supp. 253 (D.D.C. 1972), aff'd per curiam, 4 ERC 1815
(D.C. Cir. 1972), aff'd by an equally divided court sub nom. Fri v. Sierra Club, 412 U.S. 54 (1973).
The case centered on whether the phrase "enhance and protect" of § 101(b)(1) of the Clean Air
Act of 1970, 42 U.S.C. § 1857 (1970) should be interpreted to required state implementation plans
to prohibit significant deterioration of clean air areas.
62. See generally Jordan, Alternatives Under NEPA: Toward an Accomodation, 3 ECOLOGY L.Q. 705
(1973) and the numerous cases cited therein. See also. F. ANDERSON & R. DANIELS, NEPA IN THE
COURTS 179-245 (1973).
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vironmental Policy Act (NEPA). 61 It is said to be "universally accepted that the
courts have shaped NEPA, and the federal process under it, in a manner
unprecedented in the history of federal programs.164 We argue below that
much of the CIG litigation was actually quasi-legislative in its results, going
beyond either congressional intent or expectation. Other litigation had its im-
pact merely by insuring the rigorous application of provisions clearly spelled
out in the statutes.6 5 From whatever standpoint, however, it is difficult to es-
cape the conclusion that litigation was far and away the most efficacious activ-
ity carried on by environmentalist CIGs during the past decade.
If our assessment of the relative efficacy of CIG activities is correct, the
influence of the CIGs was virtually unimpaired by any limitations inherent in
the definition of a 501(c)(3) organization because the most highly cost-
effective activities are not seriously circumscribed by regulation. Hence, as
presently enforced by the IRS, the attempted regulation of political activity
may be regarded as a nuisance, but not as economically meaningful a con-
straint as it nominally appears. This view does not necessarily extrapolate
without qualification into the future. At least with respect to those key deci-
sions that establish widely applicable precedents, it may be argued that the
very success of the CIGs has narrowed the possibilities for achieving new
breakthroughs within the framework of the existing statutes. On the other
hand, the role of the CIGs as "private attorneys general" is wide open for
continued development.
III
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE CURRENT LAW
In this final section, our focus shifts slightly from "ordinary" economics to
political economy, from what is to what perhaps ought to be. Attention is
given to two principal problem areas: (1) the legal distinction between "legisla-
tive" and other political activity; and (2) compatibility between controversiality
and subventions for private providers of "public goods."
63. National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4322(c) (1970) requires the preparation of
environment impact statements for "proposals for legislation and other major Federal actions
significantly affecting the quality of the human environment." Early cases centering on the mean-
ing of "major" and "significantly" in which CIGs were plaintiffs include Monroe County Conser-
vation Council v. Volpe, 472 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1972); Citizens Organized to Defend the Envi-
ronment v. Volpe, 353 F. Supp. 520 (S.D. Ohio 1972); Natural Resources Defense Council v.
Grant, 341 F. Supp. 356 (E.D.N.C. 1972).
64. H. YARRINGTON, THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT (BNA Environmental Re-
port Monograph No. 17, 1973).
65. Riverside v. Ruckelshaus, 4 ERC 1728 (C.D. Cal. 1972) found that EPA's failure to pro-
mulgate, within sixty days, proposed transportation controls to replace a disapproved state plan
was in violation of a nondiscretionary duty imposed by section 110 of the Clean Air Act of 1970,
42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(c) (1970).
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Economists are trained to think in terms of the "equilibrium" of a model,
the set of results which emerge. Hence, they tend to equate policies which
produce identical results. For instance, they recognize that regardless of alter-
ations in the assignments of the legal liability for certain taxes, the location of
the economic burden or "incidence" is frequently invariant.16 In the context
of public policy analysis, political activities which produce substantially equi-
valent results would be regarded as themselves equivalent. For this reason, the
particular focus of the political constraints as being principally on legislative
and elective politics takes on the character of a distinction without a differ-
ence. Indeed, the attempted distinction is belied by the enormous quasi-
legislative policy impacts that CIGs have secured through the courts and
through various forms of administrative pressure.
With respect to litigation carried on by the environmentalists, we would
distinguish between two conceptually separable functions. One is to enforce a
right which is well established by virtue either of clear statutory language or
prior judicial precedent. "Enforcement" is illustrated in Riverside v.
Ruckelshaus6 7 and Wilderness Society v. Morton6 8 where the courts held that fed-
eral administrators had violated clear statutory language. By contrast, "quasi-
legislative" action is involved where the CIGs have brought litigation which
had the effect of filling interstitial gaps in the statutes.
Although there are numerous other examples, prominently including the
nondegradation interpretation of the Clean Air Act,6 9 the judicial interpreta-
tion of the National Environmental Policy Act is perhaps the best single illus-
tration of successful quasi-legislative effort by the environmentalist CIGs.711
The ultimate impact of NEPA is especially interesting because of the evidence
that most members of Congress were unaware of the implications of what
they were passing, ignoring as they did any debate on the sweeping Title I
action-forcing clauses which have been the keystone of recent environmental
66. This is important, for example, in assessing the burdens from the nominal "employer
contribution" to FICA payments. See note 5 supra. An analogous example from international
economics is discussed in Shibata, A Note on the Equivalence of Tariffs and Quotas, 58 AM. ECON.
REV. 137 (1968).
67. 4 ERC 1728 (C.D. Cal. 1972).
68. 479 F.2d 842 (D.C. Cir. 1973). This judgment held that the rights-of-way issued by the
Secretary of the Interior for the Trans-Alaskan Pipeline System (TAPS) exceeded the power
granted to him under section 28 of the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920, 30 U.S.C. § 185 (1970).
69. See note 61 supra. A general history of litigation under the Clean Air Act can be found in
C. BOLBACH, THE COURTS AND THE CLEAN AIR ACT (BNA Environmental Report Monograph No.
19, 1974).
70. See note 62 supra. On NEPA generally, see also Crampton & Berg, On Leading a Horse to
Water: NEPA and the Federal Bureaucracy, 71 MICH. L. REv. 511 (1973); Peterson, An Analysis of
Title I of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 1 ENVIRONMENTAL L. REP. 50035 (1970);
Note, The National Environmental Policy Act: A Sheep in Wolf's Clothing, 37 BROOKLYN L. REV. 139
(1970); Note, Evolving Judicial Standards Under the National Environmental Policy Act and the Chal-
lenge of the Alaska Pipeline, 81 YALE L.J. 1592 (1972).
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litigation.71 Consequently, it is debatable whether there even existed a true
legislative intent to be interpreted in this case.
As viewed by a social scientist, there is very little difference between case
law and statutory law, since their ability to shape results is virtually indistin-
guishable. It may correctly be objected that interpretive case law, when it vio-
lates legislative intent, can be overturned by statutory clarification. But it is
not difficult to make a case, based on such factors as the transactional cost of
political coalition formation, that the status quo occupies a strongly favored
position in any collective decision-making process. Due to inertial considera-
tions, laws which are incapable of legislative passage may, once effectuated, be
incapable of repeal. Hence, we argue that it would be appropriate to view the
process of affecting judge-made law under the same regulatory principles
adopted for statutory law.
A similar chain of logic suggests that the distinction between legislative
and administrative activity is also ill-founded. Indeed, the actions of adminis-
trators are themselves frequently quasi-judicial (as when statutory provisions
are interpreted) or quasi-legislative (as when EPA issues "standards" under its
Clean Air Act powers). Logically, this line of argument would conclude that
attempts to influence administrative policy formation frequently do not differ
operationally from attempts to alter legislative policy. The instruments by
which environmentalist CIGs accomplish such influence include presently
permissible activities such as media criticism (which may be highly personal)
and threats to litigate.
In rejecting the legal distinction currently attempted under the tax code
with respect to elective and legislative politics, we do not necessarily prejudge
whether consistency should be effected through extension of the prohibition
to all forms of political activity or through the converse policy of liberaliza-
tion. However, we do find some economic considerations, as opposed to legal
ones, which raise questions about public subvention of any controversial activ-
ity.
The legal literature attaches considerable importance to the interpretation
of the statutory term "charitable." 2 By approaching the tax treatment ques-
tion strictly from the standpoint of modern welfare economics and public fi-
nance, a rationale for public subvention can be elaborated which is conceptu-
ally independent of the ambiguous notion of charity. Fundamental to this
approach is a concept of an activity which produces positive "externalities" or
71. See Note, The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 and the Energy Crisis: Tie Road to
Alaska, 10 COLUM. J. LAW & SOCIAL PROB. 265, 268 & nn.l 1-16 (1974).
72. Clark, supra note 24, at 440; Hobbet, Public Interest Law Firms-To Fee or Not to Fee, 27
NAT'L TAX J. 45, 46 (1974); Note, The Tax-Exempt Status of Public Interest Law Firms, 45 S. CAL. L.
REv. 228, 232 (1972).
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"spillovers" to persons other than the one carrying on the activity.7" When
private activity provides both a direct private good and also an indirect spill-
over benefit to others, the collectivity may have an economic interest in
stimulating the provision of this "quasi-public" good. The clearest case of this
arises when the privately provided good supplants an activity which might
otherwise have been provided at government expense. The 501(c)(3) language
reflects this rationale by explicitly listing "erection or maintenance of public
buildings, monuments, or works" and "lessening of the burdens of Gov-
ernment."'7 4 The governmental burden-reduction element is a sufficient but
not a necessary condition for subvention. It is overly restrictive to require that
the government would have carried on a similar activity itself, since direct
government provision, as opposed to the subvention of a private producer,
may be much less cost-effective. In any event, the rationale of subsidization,
including subsidization through tax deductibility, boils down to an economi-
cally superior way, in certain cases, of providing "something that the collectiv-
ity wants" or "something in the public interest," the latter not necessarily
being construed altruistically.
This conception is perfectly compatible with many activities traditionally
regarded as charitable. The governmental burden-reduction argument has
explicitly been adduced with respect to the extremely important litigation ac-
tivities of CIGs. For example, the IRS suspension of rulings on claims for tax
exempt status by public interest law firms in the fall of 1970 evoked a number
of responses. Russell Train, Chairman of the Council on Environmental Qual-
ity, argued in favor of tax-exempt status for public interest law firms on the
basis of (1) the government's recognition of the importance of private litiga-
tion in the enforcement of environmental regulations and (2) the court's rec-
ognition of the right of private plaintiffs to sue to protect the public
interest. 75 However, we would distinguish, as discussed above, between en-
forcement and quasi-legislative litigation. The former fairly clearly supple-
ments governmental efforts in the implementation of existing law. Even when
such enforcement is "controversial," it can at least be argued that it is
legitimatized by a previous majority-rule collective decision so long as the en-
forcement falls within the clear intent of the enabling legislation. Hence, pri-
vate enforcement, as we narrowly define it, enjoys a strong prima facie pre-
sumption that it provides a majority-approved collective good. By contrast,
the status of quasi-legislative activity, whether through litigation or otherwise,
does not seem to warrant such a presumption.
73. For an expansion of some of the economic notions used in this section, see Davies, Financ-
ing Urban Functions and Services, 30 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 127, 132 (1965).
74. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(2) (1967).
75. Letter and memorandum from Russell Train, Chairman, Council on Environmental Qual-
ity to Randolf Thrower, IRS Commissioner, Sept. 30, 1970, in I BNA ENVIRONMENTAL REP. 745
(1970). See also note 25 supra.
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An unemotional characterization of quasi-legislative activity is, after all,
that it is simply an attempt to establish a rule without going through the
normal channels of political process. Subjective goodness of intent and the
existence of benefits to a set of third parties should not be sufficient when the
impact of the proposed rule is controversial. Such controversiality ipso facto
implies that an additional, and substantial, set of third parties is injured, or at
least does not find the activity in question to be meritorious of public subven-
tion. With respect to some private activities, such as education and relief of
the poor, society has apparently reached at least a tacit consensus that subven-
tion is warranted, that the net benefits of subsidization are beneficial to a
majority. It may well be that the net benefits even of "controversial" environ-
mentalist activity are or will be recognizable as positive by a majority political
coalition, but it is precipitate to accept this presumption uncritically without
specific evidence and debate.
There is, after all, evidence that the members of some of the most influen-
tial environmentalist CIGs are not at all a representative cross-section of the
population. Numerous studies of the Sierra Club, for instance, find that its
members rank significantly higher than the general population in income,
education, and occupational status.7 6 However, it may be regarded as invalid
to generalize from the membership of the Sierra Club to the membership of
the estimated 20,000 other environmentalist CIGs in the United States, many
of whom are quite small and concerned with other aspects of environmental
quality such as air and water pollution, land use, nuclear hazards, and waste
disposal.7 7 Using data from a nationwide survey of environmentalist CIG
members conducted by the National Center for Voluntary Action,78 Dunlap
has been able to produce socioeconomic comparisons with general population
census data for EPA Regions III and VIII.7 9 These are summarized in Table
I. While considerable, the income disparity between active members of en-
vironmentalist CIGs and the general public appears smaller than the differ-
ences in education and occupational status. The more limited sample of sur-
76. Coombs, The Club Looks at Itself, 57 SIERRA CLUB BULL. 35 (Jul./Aug. 1972); Devall, Conser-
vation: An Upper Middle Class Social Movement: A Replication, 2 J. LEISURE RESEARCH 123 (1970);
Faich & Gale, The Environmental Movement: From Recreation to Politics, 14 PACIFIC SOCIOLOGICAL
REV. 270 (1971); Harry, Gail, & Hendee, Conservation: An Upper Middle-Class Social Movement, 1 J.
LEISURE RESEARCH 129 (1969).
77. R. DUNLAP, supra note 11, at 4.
78. The survey itself is described in Smith, Methodology of the Study -Profile of the Environmental
Movement," in NATIONAL TECHNICAL INFORMATION SERVICE, ENVIRONMENTAL VOLUNTEERS IN
AMERICA (1972).
79. R. DUNLAP, supra note 11, at 13. EPA Region III consists of Pennsylvania, Virginia, West
Virginia, Maryland, and Delaware, plus the District of Columbia. Region VIII includes Colorado,
Utah, North Dakota, South Dakota, Wyoming, and Montana. The five metropolitan areas are St.
Louis; San Francisco; Birmingham; Durango, Colorado; and Amherst, Massachusetts.
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vey respondents from other EPA Regions is even higher in socioeconomic
status.s
TABLE I
SOCIOECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF ENVIRONMENTALISTS COMPARED
WITH GENERAL POPULATION,a BY EPA REGION
Region III Region VIII
Characteristics Environment Population Environment Population
Education :'
Some high school 5.8% 50.2% 3.6% 39.0%
High school graduate 14.7 30.9 9.7 33.6
Some college 18.5 8.3 21.4 14.9
College degree 21.5 5.9 24.6 7.3
Graduate work 39.6 4.6 40.8 5.3
# of cases (655) (12,898,451) (248) (2,841,468)
Occupation :C
Professional/Techni-
cal/Academic 55.8% 15.3% 60.7% 16.1%
Mgr./Administrator 15.3 7.6 12.4 9.6
Sales 3.0 6.7 4.1 7.0
Clerical/Office 6.4 18.3 2.1 16.6
Service 1.8 12.3 1.4 14.1
Agriculture 3.2 1.7 15.2 8.8
Skilled labor 9.6 14.4 3.4 12.4
Unskilled labor 4.8 23.6 .7 15.4
# of cases (437) (8,885,431) (145) (2,017,017)
Famly Income:
Under $4,999 3.8% 18.7% 7.0% 21.5%
5,000-9,999 18.5 34.8 20.7 36.5
10,000-14,999 27.9 26.6 27.8 25.5
15,000-24,999 33.4 15.4 32.6 12.9
25,000 and over 16.4 4.5 11.9 3.6
# of cases (736) (5,902,418) (270) (1,363,597)
Source: R. DUNLAP. THE SOCIOECONO.MIC BASIS FOR THE E NVIRONMENTAL MIOVEMENT: OLD
DATA, NEsS DATA, AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE '.OVEMENT'S FUTURE (Washington State University
Scientific Paper No. 4350, 1974).
aPopulation data for each region obtained by combining appropriate census data on all states
in that region. All data obtained from I U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 1970
CENSUS OF POPULATION: CHARACTERISTICS OF THE POPULATION ch. c, Tables 46, 54, 57, for all fifty
states (1973).
'Educational data reported on those twenty-five years and older.
'Occupational data reported on those sixteen years and over.
80. Id.
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Socioeconomic atypicality is not, of course, necessarily linked with atypical-
ity in regard to policy issues. With respect to environmental issues, however,
casual empiricism suggests that the willingness to purchase higher environ-
mental quality at the cost of higher prices, job losses, etc. may be positively
linked with high income and status. Dunlap, a sociologist who has specialized
in the study of the environmental movement,"' seems to share the judgment
of the authors that the atypical socioeconomic character of the environmen-
talist CIGs portends problems for the future as the "honeymoon" over the
environment fades and the conflicts with other "public" interests, such as
those of industrial workers and the urban poor, come into increasingly
sharper focus.8 2 If the environmental groups do indeed emerge as substan-
tially unrepresentative in the views they advocate, this does not carry the ad-
ditional implication that they are more unrepresentative than many other
activist groups organized around other issues. However, such conflict con-
siderations do underscore the difficulties in properly construing the term
"charitable" for purposes of public subvention.
We may summarize by saying that the potential economic basis of a sub-
vention to private activity is extremely wide. The notion of a publicly sub-
sidized but privately provided collective good is not limited to "charitable"
activities nor does it necessarily exclude "political" or controversial activities.
Nevertheless, a controversial activity should arguably be required to meet
some test of a political consensus to ensure that it qualifies as a collective good
rather than a, however well-intentioned, collective bad. The continued ability
of the de facto political activities of the environmentalist CIGs to meet such a
test is at least questionable.
81. In addition to the works cited supra note 11, see R. DUNLAP, THE IMPACT OF POLITICAL
ORIENTATION ON ENVIRONMENTAL ATTITUDES AND ACTIONS (Washington State University Depart-
ment of Sociology working paper 1974); Dunlap, Gale, & Rutherford, Concern for Environmental
Rights Among College Students, 32 AM. J. EcoN. & SOCIOLOGY 45 (1973); Dunlap & Gale, Party
Membership and Environmental Politics: A Legislative Roll-Call Analysis, 55 SOCIAL SCIENCE Q. 670
(1974); Dunlap & Gale, Politics and Ecology: A Political Profile of Student Eco-activists, 3 YOUTH AND
SOCIETY 379 (1972).
82. R. DUNLAP, supra note 11, at 18-25.
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